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Nicholas Mathers 
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Abstract 
Whether cash transfers should be poverty targeted or universal within certain social 
categories remains a hotly debated topic. Recent plans to expand Nepal’s Child Grant 
programme brought this question sharply into focus. Using available secondary data, this 
article presents a four-step analysis that examines the costs and benefits of different 
approaches. Given the country’s poverty profile, the theoretical results of different targeting 
models, government capacity and overall costs, a universal (age-cohort targeted) approach 
achieves the best outcomes for children. 
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Whether cash transfers should be poverty targeted or universal within certain social 
categories remains a hotly debated topic.1 Recent plans to expand Nepal’s child grant 
programme brought this question sharply into focus. The Child Grant – an unconditional 
cash transfer – was introduced in Nepal in 2009 to support better nutrition for children 
under 5 years of age. During its first 6 years, the Child Grant was limited to all households in 
the geographically remote Karnali region and to poor Dalit households in the rest of the 
country. In 2016, the Government took the decision to initiate expansion of the programme 
nationwide. Targeting was one of the central questions to be addressed. Here, I make the 
argument that a universal rather than a poverty-targeted approach will achieve better 
outcomes for children and is affordable.2 
The rationale put forward for poverty targeting is that it is more efficient, allowing 
sometimes scarce resources to be concentrated on those who need them most. This 
argument is appealing, but there are potentially significant costs associated with targeting. 
These include the misidentification of those who are poor; complex and expensive 
implementation; reduced incentives to work; and the creation of social and political 
tensions between those who qualify and those who do not (Devereux, 2016; Slater and 
Farrington, 2009). Universal approaches, on the contrary, are by definition more inclusive 
and are less demanding to implement – an important consideration in countries with 
widespread poverty and limited administrative capacity. In reality, most social protection 
systems – and many individual programmes including Nepal’s Child Grant – utilise a 
combination of targeting approaches. 
Which targeting approach(es) to use should primarily be an empirical question about which 
is the most effective (in terms of outcomes) and feasible (in terms of implementation and 
cost) to achieve the programme objectives. When data are limited, assessing the benefits 
and costs of different approaches can be done in four steps: first, understand the country 
poverty profile; second, using available datasets, model the theoretical targeting outcomes; 
third, review any existing empirical evidence; and fourth, calculate the total cost. 
Poverty and targeting 
In Nepal, around 25% of the population live under the official poverty line with an even 
greater number of near poor. Under-fives experience an even higher level and greater depth 
of poverty. Moreover, nearly 80% of under-fives live in a household with per capita 
consumption of less than NRs 40,000 (US$374) (Mathers, 2016). Although double the official 
per capita poverty line of NRs 19,261, this is far from being economically secure.3 In this 
context, the ‘leakage’ of benefits to well-off households – one of the problems that 
targeting aims to address – is of less concern. 
What do different targeting approaches achieve in theory? 
Table 1 shows the exclusion and inclusion errors, benchmarked against the national poverty 
line, under universal, caste- and poverty-based targeting designs and assuming perfect 
implementation. Logically, a universal Child Grant results in zero exclusion of poor under-
fives, compared with an exclusion error of more than seven in every 10 poor children for 
both the Dalit option (72%) and the simple proxy means test (PMT) (71%).4 Thus, both caste-
based targeting and the simple PMT – both of which are currently applied to the Child Grant 
– result in the exclusion of more than two-thirds of poor children. 
Inclusion errors (grant recipients who are ‘non-poor’) are more comparable across the 
different approaches. All three targeting options are slightly regressive with more than 50% 
of grant recipients being non-poor. However, it is worth noting that the universal approach 
(64%) performs slightly better than the simple PMT approach (67%). Moreover, it has been 
shown that the majority of these non-poor under-fives are in fact ‘near-poor’ and 
economically insecure. 
Table 1. Exclusion and inclusion errors for under-fives under different targeting designs. 
Child Grant targeting design 
 
Percentage of poor under-
fives excluded 
Percentage of under-fives 
included who are non-poor 
Universal 0  64 
Dalit 72  52 
Simple PMT 71  67 
Data source: Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS), 2010. 
PMT: proxy means test. 
Table 2 shows the percentage point (pp) change for different poverty measures (headcount, 
poverty gap and severity index) achieved by different targeting designs, given a fixed 
budget.5 The best outcomes are achieved by the universal and Dalit designs, with 7.3 and 8.4 
pp reductions in the poverty rate, respectively. The simple PMT performs worst, with a 4.9 
pp reduction. 
Notably, however, both the Dalit and PMT designs achieve these outcomes by transferring 
the same sizable budget to a much smaller population – a scenario that results in 
unreasonably high benefit levels for a small number of recipients and is unlikely to occur in 
practice. The universal option also achieves the best outcomes in terms of reducing the 
poverty gap (by 2.8 pp) and severity (by 1.3 units). In other words, a universal Child Grant is 
better at reaching the poorest of the poor. 
Table 2. Poverty reduction impacts under-fives under different targeting designs. 
Child Grant 
targeting design 
Percentage point (pp) reduction in national under-five poverty 
measures 
Head count  Poverty gap  Severity 
Under-five poverty 
rate  
35.8 %  8.6 %  3.1 
Universal 7.3 pp  2.8 pp  1.3 
Dalit  8.4 pp  2.3 pp  0.9 
Simple PMT  4.9 pp  1.8 pp  0.8 
Data source: Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS), 2010. 
PMT: proxy means test. 
Significance of text in Italics is to distinguish the poverty rates from the pp change in poverty 
rates. 
How does targeting work in practice in Nepal? 
The previous analysis assumed that no additional exclusion and inclusion errors result from 
poor implementation and that the targeting approach incurs no additional administrative 
costs. Given that this is unlikely, even under the best conditions, what do we know about 
how these targeting approaches work in practice? 
Experience from Nepal shows that the simple PMT associated with the Child Grant is, for 
several reasons, not actually implemented. First, official procedures are often not well 
understood by local-level implementers. Second, despite being relatively simple, measuring 
and verifying even just three indicators is administratively challenging. Third, while local 
communities accept, to some extent, a Child Grant for Dalit children, when poverty criteria 
are applied there is demand from other non-Dalit but poor households. ‘We are all poor 
here’ is a common refrain (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016). 
Implementing a more complex PMT is even more challenging in Nepal. Data collected for 
this purpose in 25 districts remained contested and unused for programming several years 
later.6 Moreover, in a pilot cash transfer project in two districts that employed a PMT, the 
financial cost of targeting was estimated at 22% of total project costs (Acharya et al., 2010), 
considerably more than the average of 4% estimated for programmes in middle-income 
countries (Slater and Farrington, 2009). 
While a PMT approach may have useful applications in certain circumstances, the current 
level of government capacity means that implementing at scale and at reasonable cost is 
still some years away. Insufficient human resources, paper-based record keeping and poor 
infrastructure limit the ability of local government to undertake regular and accurate 
measurement, recording and analysis of socioeconomic data. In such a context, a PMT 
would result in substantially higher exclusion and inclusion errors than predicted and would 
be more prone to manipulation by both beneficiaries and officials (Kidd and Wylde, 2011). 
International experience supports this analysis. In low-income countries, means-tested and 
PMT-targeted programmes have been shown to perform no better than universal child 
grants in transferring resources to poor households, despite being specifically designed to 
do so (Coady et al., 2004).7 
Geographic targeting can provide a useful option when there are specific problems to be 
addressed, such as food insecurity, within certain well-defined geographic areas. The choice 
of Karnali region for the initial roll-out of the Child Grant is a case in point. However, from a 
national perspective, it is a crude mechanism for reaching poor households, leading to high 
levels of exclusion and inclusion error. Nonetheless, when budgets are limited, geographic 
targeting can be a practical approach to achieve incremental expansion in programme 
coverage, prioritising areas with the largest proportion of or absolute number of poor or 
vulnerable households. 
What is the financial cost of a universal Child Grant? 
Assuming an incremental expansion to reach national coverage within 10 years, the cost of a 
universal Child Grant for under-fives at current benefit levels is estimated to be NRs 14.2 
billion (US$117 million) in 2025 (Mathers and Mshvidobadze, 2016).8 Accounting for an 
inflation-indexed increase in benefit levels after 5 years will result in a total budget of NRs 
21.2 billion (US$175 million). Once national coverage has been reached, the overall cost is 
projected to decline due to falling fertility rates. While these sums are certainly not small, 
they are affordable, representing between 0.25% and 0.38% of gross domestic product 
(GDP), depending on the scenario. Within the context of the 2016 national budget, an 
immediate nationwide expansion would see the Child Grant’s share of the budget grow 
from 0.2% to 1.3%. Social security as a whole would grow to 10.2% – still well within the 
Government’s own target under the Sustainable Development Goals to achieve 15% of total 
expenditure on social protection by 2030. 
Conclusion 
When deciding the most appropriate targeting approach for a particular policy, it is 
important to use all available evidence to assess the costs and benefits in the specific 
context. The four-step approach presented here provides a rounded and logical analysis for 
policy makers and is feasible in most developing countries considering data availability. In 
the case of Nepal’s Child Grant, the evidence suggests that a poverty-targeted approach will 
be practically very difficult and costly, as a share of programme resources, to implement and 
will result in an unacceptably high level of exclusion of the poor, including the poorest. On 
the other hand, a universal approach is inclusive, locally acceptable and affordable. 
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Notes 
1. ‘Universal’ is sometimes used to refer to blanket coverage of the entire population (a 
universal benefit or basic income). Here, as commonly understood, it refers to benefits that 
are available to all within a defined social category regardless of income status. 
2. This article presents analysis that was produced as part of UNICEF’s technical support to 
the Government of Nepal for the Child Grant expansion strategy in 2016. 
3. The poverty line is based on the cost of basic needs (CBN) approach and constitutes (a) a 
food basket adequate to meet minimum dietary requirements and (b) a non-food item 
basket based on the actual average non-food item consumption of borderline food insecure 
households. As such it represents the bare minimum for survival rather than the resources 
required for an acceptable standard of living. 
4. Caste-based targeting refers to the selection of Dalit households, an historically 
oppressed group at the bottom of the Hindu caste system. The simple proxy means test 
(PMT) that is applicable to the Dalit Child Grant requires that households do not own their 
own house, or have less than a certain area of farmable land, or can only produce adequate 
food for less than 3 months of the year. 
5. Each targeting design receives the same fixed budget, which allows for a transfer of NRs 
500 (US$4.70) per month per child under the universal design. 
6. ‘VDC officials challenge data on poverty in Bajura’ (Republica, 7 June, 2016). 
7. World Bank analysis from low- and middle-income countries shows that, on average, child 
grants transfer 53% more resources to poor households than purely random targeting, on a 
par with means test (53%) and PMT (50%) approaches. 
8. International Labour Organization (ILO) undertook a costing exercise when the Child 
Grant was first under consideration, coming to similar results regarding its cost and 
affordability (see ILO, 2008). 
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